JUE 19 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2024 - 11:46hs.
Rules come into force from January 1, 2025

SPA launches ordinance to combat money laundering in the sports betting and iGaming sector

The Secretariat of Prizes and Betting (SPA) published this Friday (12) Ordinance 1,143, which deals with procedures and prevention of money laundering, financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Among other actions, ‘bets’ -as operators are called in Brazil- must classify bettors' risk, report suspicious activities and verify incompatibility between users' operations, their profession or apparent financial situation. The rules come into force from January 1, 2025.

Ordinance 1,143 of the Secretariat of Prizes and Betting defines a rigorous framework of policies, procedures and controls in the fixed-odd betting sector to prevent money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Operators must adopt comprehensive risk identification, qualification and mitigation measures, in addition to maintaining detailed records and making communications to the Financial Activities Control Council (Coaf), ensuring compliance with national and international laws.

The Ordinance is applicable to sports betting and online gaming operators regarding their obligations to combat practices, including the responsibility of their administrators. Policies must define roles and responsibilities, identify risks associated with new products, promote an organizational culture of prevention and carry out continuous training activities.

According to the Ordinance, operators must define internal procedures that include the identification and qualification of risks for bettors, employees and partners, in addition to evaluating activities and operations. For the purposes of internal controls, operators must maintain operational records, updated registrations, verify compliance of financial institutions and monitor suspicious transactions.

Annually, by February 1st, sports betting and online gaming houses must send the SPA detailed reports on the practices adopted to combat money laundering, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other related crimes.

Operators must request authorization to use the Financial Activities Control System (Siscoaf), keeping their data and those of the corresponding users updated in the system.

Risk assessment procedures

Operators will be responsible for conducting internal assessments to identify and measure risks related to money laundering practices, terrorism financing, and other associated practices, documenting measures and obtained results.

In the assessments, operators must consider at least the following risk profiles:

  1. Bettors and platform users;
     
  2. The betting operator itself, considering the specificity of its business model;
     
  3. Employees, collaborators, suppliers, and third-party partners; and
     
  4. Operations, products, and services, taking into account distribution channels and the use of technologies.


Identified risks must be evaluated based on their likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of financial, legal, reputational, and socio-environmental impacts.

Identification procedures must validate the identity of bettors during registration and collect necessary information for risk qualification and classification. This information must be kept updated and reviewed as needed.

Operators must adopt procedures that allow them to qualify bettors or platform users through the collection, verification, and validation of information compatible with their risk profile.

Communications to Coaf

Operators must implement monitoring, selection, and analysis procedures for bets and associated operations to identify those that may indicate the crimes defined in the Ordinance. Bets and associated operations that signal:

  1. Lack of economic or legal basis;
     
  2. Incompatibility with usual practices of the activity or market; and
     
  3. Possible indication of money laundering, terrorism financing, or other related crimes.


Should be given special attention.

Additionally, bets and associated operations involving:

I. Persons involved or suspected of involvement in activities typified as money laundering and crimes against the financial system;

II. Persons who have committed or attempted to commit, facilitate, or participate in terrorism practices, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or their financing;

III. Persons domiciled in jurisdictions considered high risk or with strategic deficiencies in AML/CFT by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or in countries or dependencies qualified by the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service (RFB) as having favorable tax regimes or privileged fiscal regimes;

IV. Bettors' or platform users' resistance to providing additional information requested by the betting operator;

V. Provision of false or difficult-to-verify information, especially for account registration, opening, bet recording, or other operations on the betting platform;

VI. Deposits of values under suspicion regarding their origin;

VII. Prize payments under suspicion of being used for ML/TF or fraud;

VIII. Prize payments of bets under suspicion of result manipulation;

IX. Incompatibility between the bettor's operations and their usual activity patterns, occupational information, or apparent financial situation;

X. Unusual value movements suggesting the use of automated tools by the bettor;

XI. Deposit or withdrawal of values within a short time, suggesting structuring or dissimulation of operations;

XII. Withdrawal or attempted withdrawal of funds from a bettor's transactional account immediately after a deposit without placing a bet;

XIII. Unauthorized use of an account by a person other than the account holder;

XIV. Indications of account use by an intermediary placing bets for others;

XV. Deposits in quantities suggesting bet brokerage practices;

XVI. Bets in the bet exchange category indicating an arrangement by two or more bettors to place different outcome bets to transfer values between themselves, aiming at ML/TF;

XVII. Accounts opened in the name of politically exposed persons (PEPs);

XVIII. Difficulty or infeasibility in collecting, verifying, validating, or updating bettors' or platform users' registration information; and

XIX. Any characteristics that signal, especially by their unusual or atypical nature, possible indications of ML/TF or other related crimes.

The communication to Coaf must be made when there are indications of AML/CFT, detailing the characteristics and reasons for the suspicion. These communications must be made via the Financial Activities Control System (Siscoaf) and are confidential.

If there is no need for communication to Coaf during the year, a non-occurrence communication must be sent to the Secretariat of Prizes and Betting.

Procedures must ensure immediate compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions that determine the unavailability of assets owned, directly or indirectly, by individuals, legal entities, or entities subject to sanctions from such resolutions or designations.

Records and documents related to the Ordinance must be kept for at least five years. Coaf's requests must be met in accordance with the law, maintaining the confidentiality of information.

Non-compliance with established obligations subjects operators and administrators to administrative sanctions, ensuring the right to a fair hearing and full defense.

The Secretariat of Prizes and Betting may issue complementary norms, and the rules for inspection, monitoring, and sanction come into effect on January 1, 2025.

The Secretariat of Prizes and Betting may issue, within the limits of its institutional competencies, complementary norms for compliance with the provisions of the Ordinance.

Source: GMB